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Voucher Systems of Public Education Mter Nyquist and
Sloan: Can a Constitutional System Be Devised?
Criticism of the present system of American elementary and secondary education has rekindled interest in the idea, first proposed
by Adam Smith,1 of providing parents with vouchers to purchase
their children's education. The basic elements of a voucher plan are
simple. Parents are given vouchers worth roughly the per pupil cost

1. A. SMrrH, Tm: WEALTH

OF NATIONS

7!16-!18 (Mod. Lib. ed. 19117).
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of education in their city. These vouchers can be used to purchase
education at any public or private school that meets the accredita•
tion requirements imposed by the state.2 Such a system would increase the ability of parents and children to choose among various
options in the education market, a result that may, in turn, lead to
greater responsiveness by schools to the demands of education consumers, to greater satisfaction on the part of a community with its
educational system, and to the increased tailoring of specific educational programs to individual needs. 3
Critics of the voucher system have used two lines of attack. First,
they argue that the use of the voucher system would destroy public
schools by encouraging the growth of an extensive private school
system, would deepen divisions between various segments of society,
and would encourage the formation of fly-by-night schools.4 Second,
they claim that many forms of the voucher system would be unconstitutional. For instance, they warn that a voucher system could result in increased racial segregation.6 I£ the racial segregation problem
were solved by including controls over the admissions processes of
the schools involved, 6 a thornier problem would still exist with regard to public financing of parochial schools. In June 1973, Pennsylvania and New York programs that aided parochial schools and that
were similar to a voucher system in many respects were ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court because they violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. 7 A voucher program that will
be implemented in New Hampshire in September 1974 excludes
sectarian schools, but it is threatened with a suit charging that it
will therefore burden the free exercise of religion and violate the
first amendment.8 Thus, any voucher system, whether it includes or
excludes parochial schools, may be threatened by challenges based
on the first amendment.
Most commentators now conclude that the establishment and free
exercise clauses of the first amendment are, as the Supreme Court has
said, "correlative and coextensive ideas, representing only different
2. Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HARV. CIV. R.IGHTS·CIV. LIB. L. REv. 466, 468·69
(1971).
3. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: A REPORT ON
FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION BY GRANTS TO PARENTS 1-6 (1970); l\f. FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 91-94 (1962).
4. These criticisms are summarized in Areen, supra note 2, at 469-70.
5. See discussion of this problem in id. at 477-91.
6. The ramifications of this suggestion are explored in id. at 490.
7. Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Pennsylvania); Committee for Pub. Educ. &:
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist,413 U.S. 756 (1973) (New York). These cases are discussed
more fully at notes 39-53 infra and accompanying text.
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1973, § I, at 64, col. I (late city ed.).
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facets of the single great and fundamental freedom.'' 9 While the
commentators have emphasized different aspects of this freedom, 10
"[t]he general principle deducible from the First Amendment and
all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate
either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion."11
One explanation of this general principle is known as "strict neutrality." The religion clauses "should be read as stating a single precept: that government cannot utilize religion as a standard for action
or inaction because these clauses, read together as they should be,
prohibit classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit
or to impose a burden." 12 Illustratively, a statutory classification under which a state funds public schools but does not fund private
schools would be permissible. However, if a state were to aid private schools, a classification in terms of sectarian and nonsectarian
private schools would be impermissible.13
While, at one time, the Supreme Court seemed to be shifting
toward accepting strict neutrality,14 the Court's opinions now appear
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Commentators urging that the religion clauses state a unitary principle include: P. KURLAND,
RELIGION AND THE LAW 111-12 (1962); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 135-39
(rev. ed. 1967); E. SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 331-33 (1972); Schwarz,
No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 692-93
(1968).
Others who have read the religion clauses as stating a unitary principle in the sense
that the two clauses must be read together and their contending principles balanced
state that the establishment clause should be given less weight than the free exercise
clause. Such commentators include: Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Deuelopment. Part I. The Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev.
1381, 1389 (1967); Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 95, 97
Cogley ed. 1958); Murray, Law OT Prepossessions'!, 14 LAW 8: CoNTEMP. PROB. 23, 32
(1949).
10. For instance, separation of church and state was the focus of emphasis in
L. PFEFFER, supra note 9, at 727. Other commentators have emphasized the religious
liberty aspect of the first amendment. See, e.g., E. SMITH, REr.tCious LIBERTY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1972).
11. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
12. P. KURLAND, supra note 9, at 112.
13. See id. at 82.
14. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Deuelopment.
Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. R.Ev. 513, 515 (1968).
The last vestige of the strict neutrality theory is Justice Harlan's opinion, concurring
in the result, in Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 694-700 (1970). The Walz decision
upheld a New York statute that exempted church property from property taxes. Justice
Harlan grounded his concurrence on the idea that churches were simply given the same
exemption that was extended to other nonprofit organizations. Such a scheme did
not require that religion be used as a basis for classification; therefore, the requirements
of the strict neutrality theory were met. See Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 69 MtCH. L. REv. 179, 198 (1970).
Justice Harlan's advocacy of the strict neutrality theory may have been due more

a.
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to reflect an "accommodation" theory. This theory "recognizes that
there are necessary interrelationships between government and religion, that the government cannot be indifferent to religion in
American life, and that, far from being hostile or even neutral, it
may accommodate its institutions and its programs to the religious
interests of the people."15 The state "accommodates" religious interests when it tr~ats religious institutions in the same manner in which
it treats comparable secular institutions-for example, when it provides police and fire protection to churches. rn However, it also "accommodates" them when it gives preferential treatment to religious
interests in order to promote religious liberty-for example, when it
exempts churches from property taxes.17 Whatever the form of the
accommodation at stake, the Constitution may either require or prohibit a state from providing for religious-interests.18 In addition, the
Court's decisions recognize a zone of discretion in which states can
act to establish a proper balance among the competing considerations of the religion clauses if they choose to do so. 10
to his belief in judicial restraint than to his belief in the intrinsic merit of tltat theory.
In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the Court required South Carolina to make
an exception to the provision of its unemployment compensation laws that denied un•
employment benefits to a person who refused to work on Saturday. Such an exception
was necessary to accommodate the religious beliefs of the appellant. Justice Harlan
dissented: "It has been suggested that such singling out of religious conduct may vio•
late the constitutional limitations on state action •••• My own view, however, is tltat
at least under the circumstances of this case it would be a permissible accommodation
of religion for the State, if it chose to do so, to create an exception to its eligibility
requirements for persons like the appellant." 374 U.S. at 422 (emphasis original),

\

15. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE C0NSTITU110N 69 (1964). Other commentators that
have stressed the various aspects of accommodation are mentioned in notes 16-17 infra.
16. Professor Giannella refers to this type of accommodation in Giannella, supra
note 14, at 519 ("[R]eligious associations operate in the temporal realm and accordingly
can be legitimately included among the beneficiaries of the prevailing order established
and sustained by the state.''). This form of accommodation is also supported in Schwarz,
supra note 9, at 693 (The establishment clause "should be read to prohibit only aid
which has as its motive or substantial effect the imposition of religious belief or prac•
tice.''), 723 ("[A]id which does not have the effect of inducing religious belief, but
merely accommodates or implements an independent religious choice, does not increase
the danger of religion and, since it does not offend the value of parental choice, docs
not violate the no-imposition standard.').
17. See Giannella, supra note 9, at 1389 ("[T]he Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner
(374 U.S. 398 (1963)] held that the state must make special provisions to relieve religious
liberty from restrictions imposed by generally legitimate governmental regulations.');
Katz, Radiations from Church Tax Exemption, 1970 SUP, CT, REv. 93, 102 ("With a
neutrality interpretation, tbe Establishment Clause permits special provisions for re•
ligion ••. .'); Kauper, supra note 14, at 197 (Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the
majority opinion in Walz v. Tax Commn., .397 U.S. 664 (1970), in which the tax exemptions were upheld, asserted that the e.xemptions were consistent with the state's neutral
stand toward religion, "but his (Burger's] is the neutrality of accommodation and a
neutrality which, by according a central place to religious liberty, permits a preferential
treatment for religion.').
18. P. KAUPER, supra note 15, at 77.
19. That there is such a zone of discretion was made clear in ·walz v. Tax Commn.,
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To determine whether an accommodation is required, permitted,
or prohibited, the courts must engage in a pragmatic appraisal and
reconciliation of various interests.20 The most important of these are,
of course, the interests that underlie the religion clauses.21
A major purpose of the religion clauses is to guarantee that states
neither encourage nor discourage participation in religious life. For
the sake of convenience, this concept will be referred to as "voluntarism.''22 One aspect of voluntarism is the concern ·with freedom of
conscience generally associated with the free exercise clause; 23 voluntarism guarantees in<:Iividual freedom to believe and to express that
belief.24 Direct restraints on belief and worship, and the imposition
of civil disabilities because of religious affiliation were two of the
evils against which the first amendment was directed.25
Voluntarism also dictates that the growth and advancement of a
religious sect come from the voluntary support of its membership.
Thus, it is an infringement of religious liberty to compel people to
pay taxes to support religious activities or institutions.26 The sentiment that led to the adoption of the first amendment was in part a
reaction against the taxes that the colonies exacted for church
support.27
397 U.S. 664 (1970): "The limits of permissible state .accommodation to religion are by

no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."
397 U.S. at 673. "Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for
play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." 397 U.S. at 669.
20. P. KAuPER, supra note 15, at 69. Other commentators who believe that the Court
should use a balancing process to determine what the first amendment permits include:
Schwarz, supra note 9, at 734; Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579, 614 (1969). Professor Giannella suggests that
a restricted balancing approach be used for cases concerned with required accommodations, Giannella, supra note 9, at 1384-85, but criticizes the broad balancing test suggested by Professor Kauper as giving the Court too much discretion, Giannella, supra
note 14, at 531. A similar criticisin of the broad balancing test is made in Choper, The
Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 323-25 (1968).
21. See P. KAuPER, supra note 15, at 76-77; Schwarz, supra note 9, at 734-37; Valente,
supra note 20, at 614. The restrictions that Professor Giannella would put on a restricted
balancing approach for cases concerned with required accommodation are de_termined
by the values underlying the religion clauses: "[I']he Court, in giving content to the
first amendment, should attempt to incorporate the human purposes and values underlying it." Giannella, supra note 9, at 1384.
22. The term "voluntarism" was used in this manner in Justice Harlan's opinion,
concurring in the result, in Walz: "This legislation neither encourages nor discourages
participation in religious life and thus satisfies the voluntarism requirement of the First
Amendment." Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970). The term was also used
in this manner in Giannella, sµpra note 14, at 517.
23. Giannella, supra note 14, at 517.
24. P. KAUPER, supra note 15, at 13.
25. Giannella, supra note 9, at 1386.
26. P. KAuPER, supra note 15, at 14.
27. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 9-14 (1947).
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A second major purpose of the religion clauses may be referred
to as political noninvolvement: Religious differences should be kept
out of politics; religious pressures and interfaith dissension should
play no part in the political process.28 One aspect of political noninvolveµient is the requirement that state governments show no trace
of ecclesiastical influence. This aspect was reflected in Epperson v.
' Arkansas,29 in which the Supreme Court invalidated an Arkansas
statute that forbade the teaching of evolutionary theory in public
schools. The ground for decision was that a state government should
not manipulate the curriculum in public schools to sanction a particular religious belief.so
Political noninvolvement also requires that churches not be subject to state control.81 This aspect most often comes into play when
government bodies attach strings to financial aid to sectarian institutions. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 82 the Court struck down programs
through which Rhode Island and Pennsylvania helped pay the
salaries of teachers hired by sectarian schools to teacl,i secular subjects. The Court found that the surveillance of the teachers' work
and the audit of financial records that would be required to ensure
that state moneys were not spent on sectarian functions would result
in excessive governmental entanglement with church affairs.88 In
essence, these tasks would lead the state to force its mm definition of
religion on the sectarian schools.84
Finally, the political noninvolvement principle seeks to avoid po•
litical strife over religion. 35 The first two aspects of the principle
relate to this goal, but it has an independent force. For example, in

Committee of Public Education &- Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 80
where a program of aid to sectarian schools was held to be unconstitutional, the Court based its decision on, among other things, a fear
that the annual appropriations that the program would require
would lead to annual political contention between religious groups.117
While the values underlying the religion clauses often dictate
that a state may not grant a benefit to a religious group, a state is
frequently permitted or required to protect religious liberty by giv28. Giannella, supra note 14, at 517.
29. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
30. Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presb1•terian Church
Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REv. 347, 347.
31. Id.
32. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
33. 403 U.S. at 620-22.
34. See 403 U.S. at 620.
35. Giannella, supra note 14, at 517. But see Schwarz, supra note 9, at 710-11.
36. 41!! U.S. 756 (1973),
37. 413 U.S. at 794-98.
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ing religious interests equal or preferential treatment. A full voucher
system-that is, one in which both secular and sectarian schools participate-raises the question of whether such an accommodation to
religious interests is permitted. If the accommodation is permitted,
a full voucher system is within a state's zone of discretion. 38 On the
other hand, a partial voucher system-one in which only secular
schools participate-raises the question whether, if a state decides to
use a voucher system; it is required to include sectarian schools.

I. A

FULL VOUCHER SYSTEM
'

In the recent cases of Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist 89 and Sloan v. Lemon,40 the Supreme
Court struck down tuition grant programs in New York (Nyquist)
and Pennsylvania (Sloan). The tuition grant plans provided for partial tuition reimbursements to many41 parents who sent their children to nonpublic schools. Under these programs, as under a full
voucher system, the states provided money to parents of schoolchildren, and the funds were ultimately contributed to sectarian schools.
The New York plan also provided tax credits for any parent whose
child attended a nonpublic school and who was not eligible for a
tuition grant. 42 This provision was also struck down.
The Court found that the purpose of the programs-to enhance
the quality of education-was secular. 43 However, it also found that
the tuition grant programs and the tax credit program, in effect, constituted direct aid to sectarian schools. The fact that the aid was
given, not directly to the schools, but to the parents, was favorable to
its constitutionality, but the Court said that that fact was only one
of many to be considered.44 More significant was the fact that the aid
was not restricted to the purely secular activities of the schools. Focusing on the general nature of the aid, the Court distinguished46
the forms of support-state provision of bus fares and textbooks to
parents of all school children, including parents of those in parochial
schools-that had been found to be constitutional in Everson v.
Board of Education46 and Board of Education v. Allen.47 The tuition
38. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
39. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
40. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
41. In New York the subsidy was only to parents with incomes under 5000 dollars.
42. The New York plan is described in 413 U.S. at 762-68. The Pennsylvania plan
is described in 413 U.S. at 828-31.
43. 413 U.S. at 772; 413 U.S. at 829-30.
44. 413 U.S. at 781.
45. 413 U.S. at 780-83; 413 U.S. at 832-33.
46. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
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grants in New York and Pennsylvania could be used to pay for
both the religious and the secular aspects of the educational process.
In contrast, the bus rides in Everson had no inherent religious significance, and the state in Allen48 did not authorize the loan of religious books.
This factor alone, however, should not be sufficient to distinguish
Everson and Allen. While, in those cases, the functions aided were,
superficially, separate from the sectarian functions of church schools,
economic realities make the distinction meaningless. The tax money
that paid for bus fares and textbooks necessarily freed money that
would othenvise have been spent for those items. This money could
now be spent on other, more religious-oriented, aspects of the children's education.49
The Court's distinction on the ground that there is no unconstitutional direct aid to religious functions if such functions are
supported solely as a result of aid to secular functions that frees otherwise unavailable funds 50 can best be explained by the presence of
other .first amendment values in Nyquist and Sloan. In effect, the aid
in those cases constituted a special benefit to a special class-a class
defined on the basis of religious beliefs. The special benefit was that,
48. 392 U.S. at 244. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in part and dissenting in part
in Nyquist, found this distinction irrelevant: "There are at present many forms of government assistance to individuals that can be used to serve religious ends, such as social
security benefits or 'G. I. Bill' payments, which are not subject to nonreligious-use restrictions. Yet, I certainly doubt that today's majority would hold those statutes uncon•
stitutional under the Establishment Clause." 413 U.S. at 804, Furthermore, in Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court delivered an opinion in which such a
distinction was not made. In Quick Bear, members of the Sioux Indian Tribe, for whom
trust and treaty funds were set aside by the federal government in order to provide for
education, were able to elect to attend religious schools. The Court refused to issue an
injunction against the disbursement of public money to those schools.
Justice Powell believed that Quick Bear could be distinguished on the ground that
that case did not involve the distribution of public, tax-raised funds. "The funds that
were utilized by the Indians to provide sectarian education were treaty and trust funds
which the Court emphasized belonged to the Indians as payment for the cession of
Indian land and other rights." 143 U.S. at 781 n.37.
Justice Powell also distinguished the use' at sectarian schools of aid provided by tlie
G.I. Bill. The essence of the distinction was that the G.I. Bill provides aid for a wide
range of students, most of ,vhom do not attend sectarian schools, while most of the
beneficiaries under the New York (and Pennsylvania) tuition grant programs were people whose children attended sectarian schools. 413 U.S. at 782·83 n.38. Furtlicrmore,
there arc significant differences benveen the religious aspects of church-related institu•
tions of higher learning, where the G.I. Bill benefits are used, and those of parochial
elementary and secondary schools, toward which the benefits of the tuition grant pro•
grams were directed. 413 U.S. at 777 n.32.
49. Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1, 172 (1971),
50. The Court said that the aid from tuition grants "is quite unlike the sort of 'in•
direct' and 'incidental' benefits that flowed to sectarian schools" in Everson and Allen,
Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832. "In the absence of an effective means of guaranteeing that the
state aid derived from public funds will be used exclusively for secular, neutral, and
nonideological purposes, it is clear from our cases that direct aid in whatever form is
invalid." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780.
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in addition to the right they already had to send their children to
public schools, parents of children attending private schools were
also given the grant money. 51 While the tuition grants and the tax.
credit were theoretically available to all who sent their children to
private schools, they were in fact given to a special class consisting of
members of the Roman Catholic faith, since Catholics were, by far,
the primary users of nonpublic schools.52
The special benefit in Nyquist and Sloan was also considered
suspect in that it might tend to create political strife along religious
lines.li 3 Since the program that aided sectarian schools was separate
from the financing of public schools, annual appropriations decisions
concerning each program could lead to religious partisanship.
. Any aid to religious functions is suspect because it tends to encourage religion. 54 However, if the aid is given to religious interests
merely as part of a program aiding a broader class of beneficiaries,
the problem of encouragement should be ameliorated by the fact
that a denial of aid to religious interests alone would tend to inhibit
religion. The aid in Nyquist and Sloan, in effect, conferred a special
benefit only on religious interests, so that there was no such ameliorating factor.
In contrast to Nyquist and Sloan, the Court in Walz v. Tax
Commission55 upheld the constitutionality of a property tax. exemption for religious institutions. The exemption, granted by the New
York City Tax Commission "to religious organizations for religious
properties used solely for religious worship," was part of a larger tax.
exemption program for religious, educational, and charitable institutions. 56 The reasons for upholding the exemption were consistent
with both the voluntarism and the political noninvolvement purposes of the first amendment. They included: the long history of
such exemptions; 57 the fact that the exemption decreased, rather
than expanded, the entanglement of the state with religious institutions;68 the aid the exemption gave to state efforts to avoid hostili~y
51. "The grants to parents of private schoolchildren are given in addition to the
right that they have to send their children to public schools 'totally at state expense.'"
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38. "The State has singled out a class of its citizens for a
special economic benefit. Whether that benefit be viewed as a simple tuition subsidy, as
an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian schools, or as a reward for
having done so, at bottom its intended consequence is to preserve and support religionoriented institutions.'' Sloan, 413 U.S. at 832.
52. See 413 U.S. at 768, 774, 780; 413 U.S. at 830.
53. See 413 U.S. at 794-98; 413 U.S. at 828, 830.
54. Cf., e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970); 397 U.S. at 710-11
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
55. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
56. 397 U.S. at 666.
57. 397 U.S. at 677.
58. 397 U.S. at 674.
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to religion; 59 the fact that tax exemptions are qualitatively different
from grants of money, since grants require the government to transfer part of its revenue to churches, while tax exemptions merely
involve the government's abstention from demands that the church
support the state; 60 and the fact that the aid given through tax exemptions was not limited to religious organizations, but, rather, was
given to a broad range of beneficiaries.01
A full voucher system will be able to avoid the special treatment
pitfall if the monetary value of the voucher is high enough. If it is,
parents who do not belong to a religious denomination that already
supports a system of sectarian schools or who do not choose to send
their children to sectarian schools may want to use the vouchers at
nonsectarian private schools and, in response to this demand, many
new private schools may be able to come into existence. In that case,
the state voucher system would not benefit a predominantly religious
class but would offer realistic private educational alternatives to all
its citizens. 62
There would still be one serious problem with a full voucher
system. In such a system, the class of beneficiaries would be broadas they were in the systems ruled constitutional in Everson and Allen
-but the benefits would not be restricted to the secular side of the
institutions. This latter factor-not present in Everson and Allenseemed critical to the ruling in Nyquist and Sloan that the programs
under consideration were unconstitutional. But, in Nyquist, Justice
Powell explicitly left open the question of whether the failure to
restrict the aid to the secular side would, in itself, invalidate a
voucher-type system:
Because of the manner in which we have resolved the tuition
grant issue, we need not decide whether the significantly religious
59. 397 U.S. at 673.
60. 397 U.S. at 675. Justice Brennan, in his concurring opinion, also distinguished
tax exemptio!1s and general subsidies, saying that most tax exemptions constitute a
mere passive state involvement with religion. 397 U.S. at 690-91.
61. 397 U.S. at 670-72. The property tax exemptions applied to nonprofit, quasi•
public corporations that fostered moral or mental improvement. These included hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, and scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups.
In Justice Harlan's opinion, which concurred in the result, the broad range of bene•
ficiaries was the prime factor supporting the constitutionality of the property tax exemption:
The statute which implements New York's constitutional provision for tax ex•
emptions to religious organizations has defined a class of nontaxable entities whose
common denominator is their nonprofit pursuit of activities devoted to cultural
and moral improvement and the doing of "good works" . . • .
To the extent that religious institutions sponsor the secular activities tlmt this
legislation is designed to promote, it is consistent with neutrality to grant them an
exempt!on just as other organizations devoting resources to these projects receive
exemptions.
397 U.S. at 696-97.
62. Casenote, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1081, 1090 n.62 (1973).
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character of the statute's beneficiaries might differentiate the present
cases from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g.,
scholarships) made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted.63
To determine whether the lack of a specially benefitted religious class
should be sufficient to cause a full voucher system to be held constitutional, 64 the purposes and values of the first amendment must be
examined.
The aspect of voluntarism that stresses free individual choice in
religion poses no barrier to the creation of a full voucher system.
Allowing a parent to choose among a variety of options in deciding
where his child should go to school restrains no one's religious beliefs. In fact, the voucher system is more compatible with freedom of
individual belief than is a public school system. 65 If state support is
provided only to public schools, all parents have a financial incentive
to send their children to those schools, even though many of them
may feel that they have a religious obligation to educate their children in parochial schools. The existing system is, thus, arguably hostile to religious interests in that it forces certain taxpayers to bear a
double financial burden-tuition, as well as taxes that support public education-if they are to educate their children as their religious
beliefs require. A voucher system would allow parents to choose to
send their children to sectarian schools without compelling them to
incur additional expenses.
The existing system is also arguably hostile to religion in that it
encourages parents to send their children to schools where teachers
will tend to transmit values that conform to the values of those who
control the public school system. There will be variety among teach63. 413 U.S. at 782-83 n.38. Later in this opinion Justice Powell made a similar comment: "Without intimating whether this factor alone might have controlling significance
in another context in some future case, it should be apparent that in terms of the potential divisiveness of any legislative measure the narrowness of the benefitted class
would be an important factor." 413 U.S. at 794.
64. In some cases, the Court has allowed or required preferential treatment of religious interests where that has been necessary in order to reconcile the competing values
underlying the first amendment. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the encouragement-a released-time program in which the state allowed children at public schools
to attend religious instruction conducted off the school premises-was so minimal that
it fell within the state's zone of discretion. The preferential treatments in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), were necessary
to prevent the state from inhibiting religion. See note 91 infra. The aid in Walz enabled the state to avoid entangling itself in church affairs; granting the tax exemption
also allowed the state to avoid placing itself in the role of a potential oppressor in
collecting taxes and prevented the state from discouraging the practice of religion by
granting benefits -only to nonreligious nonprofit institutions. See text accompanying
notes 55-61 supra.
65. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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ers, but the system as a whole must make some value choices: The
selection of textbooks on a system-wide basis will tend to transmit
certain perspectives, especially in such areas as history, literature,
and the social sciences; the choice of methods of accommodating religion, such as released-time programs or Christmas programs, will
tend to transmit certain judgments on the importance of religion
and on the relative importance of different religions; and the choice
between a progressive and a traditional educational system will tend
to transmit a certain view as to the relative value of a life-style that
prizes emotional experience and creativity as opposed to one that
stresses self-discipline. Certainly, a public school system can attempt
to provide variety in its programs, but such attempts will be limited
because of expense and because the majority of the electorate in any
school district will usually insist that its values be dominant. A full
voucher system may provide alternatives for parents who disagree
with the majority's values that necessarily dominate any school district.
The other aspect of the voluntarism purpose concerns state support of sectarian institutions. While states are permitted to make
some accommodations to religious interests, other accommodations,
such as providing certain churches with support from tax revenues,
are not permitted.66 Accommodations involving economic aid are the
most suspect. 67 Nevertheless, all economic aid to religious interests
is not precluded. 68 Rather, a preclusion of religious interests from
financial benefits provided by the government to society at large
could constitute governmental hostility to religion. 00
66. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
67. A comparison of Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 806 (1952), and Illinois ex rel.
Mccollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), is illustrative. Both cases concerned
whether released-time programs for religious education were permitted under the first
amendment. The released-time program in Zorach, in which religious instruction took
place away from the public school building, was upheld; the program in .McCollum, in
which the religious instruction took place within the public school building, was struck
down. The most obvious difference between the two cases is that in McCollum the state
was providing economic aid to religious interests in the form of imputed rent, while in
Zorach the state did no more than change school schedules to accommodate religious
interests.
'
68. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), and Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672
(1971), illustrate the Court's method of determining what is a permissible accommodation to religion where a state wishes to treat religious institutions in the same manner
in which it treats comparable secular institutions. How the Court determines what
constitutes a permissible accommodation to religion when religion is to receive preferential treatment is demonstrated by Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664 (1970), discussed
in text accompanying notes 55-61 supra, and Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952),
discussed in note 67 supra.
69. "In short, making religious voluntarism a reality requires that religious associations be treated with political equality and accorded civil opportunities for self-development on a par with other voluntary associations. For instance, to deprive churches of
police and fire protection-because the state would be aiding religion in violation of
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Where a parent would otherwise refrain from sending his child
to sectarian schools because of the economic burden, a full voucher
system may provide an economic incentive to use private parochial
schools.70 However, the fact that a parent incidentally receives such
an incentive from a plan designed to benefit all children does not, in
itself, violate the first amendment. The total program must be analyzed. The school-financing scheme must not unduly encourage religious education, but it also must not discourage it. Treating religious groups in the same way that similar secular groups are
treated will usually meet both those requirements. If the value of the
vouchers is high enough, no special treatment should exist.
One requirement of the political noninvolvement principle is
that churches not be subject to state control.71 In school aid cases,
this problem has generally been dealt with under the rubric of entanglement.72 A full voucher system need cause no impermissible
entanglement. The state plays a role in regulating sectarian schools
for such purposes as accreditation and fire inspection, even when no
financial aid is provided.73 State financing of sectarian schools
through vouchers to parents would present even less serious problems, since such a system would require no church-state contact.74
A voucher system that did not require state money to be spent
strictly on secular functions would not require state surveillance of
teachers, as did the system in Lemon, nor would it involve the state
in the role of telling churches what constitutes a religious function.
Another aspect of the political noninvolvement principle is the
avoidance of political strife along religious lines.75 In Nyquist, Justice Powell expressed the fear that the tax programs involved might
cause political divisions along religious lines and that the consequent
the establishment clause-would be insupportable doctrine." Giannella, supra note 14,
at 520.
70. In Nyquist, Justice Powell commented on the extreme situation where a tuition
grant is deliberately used as an incentive: "[I]f the grants are offered as an incentive to
parents to send their children to sectarian schools by making unrestricted cash payments to them, the Establishment Clause is violated •.••" 413 U.S. at 786.
71. Kauper, supra note 30, at 347.
72. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971).
73. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
74. "But whatever may be the weight and contours of entanglement as a separate
constitutional criterion, it is of remote relevance in the case before us with respect to
the validity of tuition grants or ta.x credits involving or requiring no relationships whatsoever between the State and any church or any church school." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
822 (White, J., dissenting). Furthermore, in Nyquist, the Court gave no indication that
the financing involved in the New York programs constituted unconstitutional entanglement in the sense that there was too great a continuing relationship between church
and state. However, Justice Powell indicated that the New York programs carried a
"grave potential for entanglement in the broader sense of continuing political strife over
aid to religion." 413 U.S. at 794.
'
75. See, e.g., Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 794.
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strife would be aggravated both by the need for continuing annual
appropriations and by the likelihood of demands for larger appropriations as costs and population grow. 70 Justice Powell's "direct-aid"
test may have reflected this concern; since the test did not reflect
economic reality, 77 it may have rested on the public's psychological
reaction to direct aid. 78 That is, the directness of the aid given may
be one measurement of the psychological reaction that aid to a secular function will arouse in those who receive no benefits; nonbelievers may resent and take political action against aid to believers
if, because the secular functions aided are not clearly separated from
sectarian functions, they suspect that religious activities of the believers are aided.
Under a full voucher system, fears of political partisanship and
resentment along religious lines would not be warranted. A full
voucher system would not cause annual interreligious strife about
school appropriations because an increase in appropriations for
vouchers that could be used for sectarian schools would mean that
appropriations for vouchers to be used for secular schools would also
be increased, and vice versa. Thus, any political division over the
amounts to be appropriated for the voucher system would be along
lines other than religion.
Nor should the fact that the aid provided through a full voucher
system seems to be as direct as that provided in Nyquist cause the
resentment feared by Justice Powell. There should be less resentment if believers and nonbelievers receive the same form and
degree of aid and all have comparable opportunities to send their
children to schools that suit their tastes. Thus, if political resentment
76. 413 U.S. !1t 795-98.
77. See text accompanying notes 43-50 supra.
78. "Directness" may refer to how the aid is labeled: If it is labeled "for bus fares,"
it may be considered to be directly aiding a secular functipn; llowever, if it is labeled
"for education," it may be said to be aiding a sectarian function, because education in
parochial schools is partially a sectarian function. However, this distinction is not coll•
elusive, because the economic aid in Walz was labeled "for church property" and was
upheld, even though church property is, by definition, used for sectarian purposes.
Furthermore, the Pennsylvania and New York legislatures intended the aid they gave
to be labeled "for secular education."
A more convincing use of the direct-aid test is to require not only that the aid be
labeled for a secular function (for example, for bus fares), but also that it be provided
for a function that is "indisputably marked off from the religious function." Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I, 18 (1947). Aid labeled "for secular education" would not
satisfy this latter requirement, if, for instance, it were used to pay salaries for teachers
or to pay for the maintenance of buildings in which both secular and sectarian subjects
were taught. In those cases, a state could not be certain that the sectarian school would
sufficiently separate the normally intertwined secular and sectarian functions, Nyquist,
413 U.S. at 778-79, unless the state engaged in such surveillance of the school as to
cause excessive entanglement. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971).
This last interpretation of the direct-aid test is probably the interpretation that
Justice Powell meant to adopt, even though, again, it fails to distinguish Walz.
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based on religious divisions is to be avoided, a test based on the
special-footing distinction should be more useful than one based on
the direct-aid distinction.
There are, however, ways in which a voucher system could breed
division and resentment. For example, if, under the system as implemented, most children were to attend schools that cater to narrow
groups defined along religious or class lines, the potential for intergroup fear and dislike could be enormous. Another potential problem would arise if the schools of a few denominations or groups
were greatly superior to those of other denominations; in that situation, the members of one group might resent the other groups or
feel compelled to send their children to sectarian schools that teach
doctrines they do not accept in order to give their children a good
education. These possibilities cannot be ignored, but they are only
possibilities, and the states should be allowed to experiment with
voucher programs until they prove to be real problems.79
Although it is not grounded in the first amendment, the state's
desire to improve its educational programs should also be considered
in assessing the validity of voucher systems. 80 State autonomy in the
area of school financing should be and is encouraged, because of the
complexities of financing and the importance of education to the
citizenry. To refuse to allow a state to experiment with a full
voucher system would constitute an extraordinary intrusion of the
federal judiciary into the state's control over its educational system.
On balance, state experimentation with full voucher systems
should be permitted. If it becomes apparent after a system has been
fully implemented that it does not provide educational alternatives
for the general public but only benefits the religious groups now
served by parochial schools, judicial intervention may then be
appropriate.

II. A PARTIAL VOUCHER SYSTEM
In September 1974, New Hampshire will begin a pilot partial
voucher system. Under this program, as many as 8,000 students will
be able to choose to attend any nonsectarian, private, accredited
school, with assistance from the government, or to attend any public
school in their district.81 Not surprisingly, a Roman Catholic group
has threatened suit to block implementation of the system.82
Commentators83 have suggested, with little discussion, that a
79. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
80. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
81. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
82. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1973, § I, at 64, col. I (late city ed.).
83. See Areen, supra note 2, at 492; Note, Education Vouchers: The Fruit of the
Lemon Tree, 24 STAN. L. REv. 687, 689-90 (1972).
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voucher plan like that to be adopted by New Hampshire would
violate the first amendment by imposing a burden on the free exercise of religion by parents who believe that their children should be
educated in religious schools, for they must choose either to follow
their religious beliefs and forgo a benefit available to everyone else
or to ignore their beliefs and receive the benefit.81
This burden might be justified if a voucher system that included
sectarian schools violated the first amendment's prohibition on direct aid to secular schools. In that case, the institution of a partial
system would be the only way in which a state could experiment
with the voucher system of financing education. However, as this
Note has indicated, it does not appear that a full voucher system
would violate the first amendment.
The state may also argue that the competing first amendment
values are so well balanced in this situation that the system falls
within that zone of discretion in which a state can establish what in
its judgment is a proper reconciliation of competing first amendment
interests.
If the state cannot put forward persuasive reasons why the exclusion of sectarian schools from the voucher system does not impermissibly burden the free exercise of religion, then the state must
adopt a full voucher system, as a required accommodation to religious interests, if it wishes to adopt any system at all. However,
it is unlikely that an accommodation involving the grant of financial
aid to religious institutions will be required. While political units
have, in some cases, been permitted to give aid to sectarian institutions, 85 the cases in which they have been required to do so are very
rare. 86 Two state supreme court decisions have, however, imposed
84. In Board of Education v. Allen, appellee Allen argued that the parents of a
child attending a sectarian school would be faced with such a dilemma if the child
were not allowed to receive secular textbooks from the state, since children attending
nonsectarian schools did receive such books. Brief for Appellee Allen at 39, Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). While the Court upheld the te.xtbook program, it
did not discuss this issue. Cf. discussion of Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (196!1), in
text accompanying note 104 infra.
85. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S.
664 (1970); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, the Court said, "[W]e do not mean to intimate that a state
could not provide transportation only to children attending public schools , • • ," 330
U.S. at 16. In Walz, the Court spoke of "permissible state accommodation to religion,"
397 U.S. at 673 (emphasis added).
86. While it has been suggested that property ta.x exemptions for church property
could be found to be a required accommodation, Note, Constitutionality of State Property Tax Exemptions for Religious Property, 66 Nw. U. L. REv. 118, 133.34 (1971), the
Walz decision clearly did not encompass such a finding. Similarly, in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971), the Court indicated that its task is to "perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity" (emphasis added). While Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), contains no explicit language to the effect that the accommodation is merely permitted, it seems clear that it docs not require a state to lend
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such a requirement. In State ex rel. Hughes v. Board of Education,81
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that county
boards of education that provided transportation to and from public
schools violat~d the first amendment by denying such transportation
to children attending parochial schools. The Michigan Supreme
Court reached a similar result in Traverse City School District v.
Attorney General, 88 which ruled that the religion clauses of the first
amendment require that students attending private sectarian schools
be allowed access to shared-time instruction and auxiliary services
available to public school students.89 The court in Hughes merely
stated its conclusion that the accommodation was required. 90 The
court in Traverse City, however, reasoned that the denial to sectarian
school students of access to the services available to public school
students imposed a burden on the free exercise of religion; the imposition of this burden was found to be unconstitutional because it
was not justified by a compelling state interest. 91
textbooks to private schools. In Leutkemeyer v. Kaufmann, 42 U.S.L.W. 2189 (\V.D. Mo.,
Sept. 24, 1973) (three-judge court), the court decided that the Missouri statutes that
provided for transportation of public school pupils to and from school but did not
provide like transportation for pupils at church-related schools did not unconstitutionally deny nonpublic school students the equal protection of the laws.
87. -W. Va.-, 174 S.E.2d 711 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 944 (1971).
88. 384 Mich. 390, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971).
89. 384 Mich. at 431-34, 185 N.W.2d at 27-29. In 64th St. Residences, Inc. v. City of
New York, 4 N.Y.2d 268, 276, 150 N.E.2d 396, 399, 174 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5, cert. denied, 357
U.S. 907 (1958), the New York Court of Appeals, while upholding the constitutionality
of a sale of public land to a sectarian university, suggested that the university would
have been deprived of its constitutional rights if it alone had been excluded from
bidding.
It has also been suggested that it would be possible to argue that the constitutional
provisions of Virginia and West Virginia, which prohibit the incorporation of churches
but allow the incorporation of other nonprofit institutions, violate the free exercise
clause. Kauper 8: Ellis, Religious Corporations and the Law, 71 Mica. L. R.Ev. 1499,
1564-65 (19'73).
90. - W. Va. at-, 174 S.E.2d at 719.
91. 384 Mich. at 433, 185 N.W .2d at 28-29.
The approach in Hughes and Traverse City is also found in Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), two cases that illustrate
the Supreme Court's method of determining when an accommodation that consists of
preferential treatment of religious interests is required. In Sherbert, the Court ruled
that the denial of unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist because she refused to work on Saturday and was thus unable to find a job burdened her free exercise of religion. While the statute in question-S.C. CoDE .ANN. § 64--4 (1962), as amended,
S.C. CODE .ANN. § 64--4 (Supp. 1973), which specifically prohibited the firing of textile
plant employees who refuse to work on Sunday-did not, on its face, classify people
on the basis of religion, its effect was to force the plaintiff to choose between follo'jVing
the precepts of her religion and forfeiting unemployment benefits, on the one hand,
and disobeying such precepts and receiving the benefits, on the other. 374 U.S. at 404.
The conflict in Sherbert was between the interest in allowing the voluntary practice
of religion and the fear of giving preferential treatment to religion. The Court resolved
this conflict in favor of the voluntary practice of religion, because such practice would
have been greatly impaired by the denial of unemployment benefits, while the granting
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However, most other decisions have not required that economic
aid be extended equally to sectarian and nonsectarian schools. For
example, in Brusca v. State of Missouri ex rel. State Board of Education,92 a three-judge federal court in Missouri held that the provisions of the Missouri constitution that established a free public
school system but prohibited the use of public funds to aid sectarian
schools directly or indirectly did not violate the free exercise clause
of the first amendment.
Dicta in several United States Supreme Court cases indicate
that states that adopt a voucher system may not be required to include sectarian schools. One such case was Norwood v. Harrison. 03
The question was whether Mississippi could lend textbooks to students in public and private schools without regard to whether any
participating private school had a racially discriminatory policy.
Mississippi argued that, since a state could not prohibit parents from
educating their children at private schools, 04 it would be a denial of
equal protection to discriminate against children of parents who
exercised this constitutionally protected choice by denying them
textbooks. 95 The Court pointed out that states have never been
required to aid private schools. 96 Furthermore, the Court said,
"Even assuming . . . that the Equal Protection Clause might require state aid to be granted to private nonsectarian schools in some
circumstances . . . a State could rationally conclude as a matter of
legislative policy that constitutional neutrality as to sectarian schools
might best be achieved by withholding all state assistance." 07
In Sloan, Justice Powell made a similar point. The appellants
ingeniously asked the Court to declare the provisions of the Pennsylvania statute severable and thereby allow tuition reimbursements
of benefits would, in comparison, not further the interests of the religion in question
to any great extent. In addition, this resolution would not appear to create strife between religious factions. The Court's approach could also be interpreted as giving additional weight to the free exercise interest.
The Court in Yoder found that Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law, which
required a child to attend school until he reached the age of 16, violated the free excr•
cise right of the Amish, who had declined to send their children to public or private
schools after they had completed the eighth grade. The Court considered both the
state's interest in requiring the Amish children to attend an extra year or two of school
and the value of parental discretion in the religious upbringing and education of
children. As in Sherbert, the interest in allowing freedom of belief overcame the interest in prohibiting governmental encouragement of religion.
332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971), affd. without opinion, 405 U.S. 1050 (1072).
413 U.S. 455, 462 (1973).
See 413 U.S. at 461, citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
413 U.S. at 461-62.
413 U.S. at 462. Norwood was used as precedent on this point in Leutkemeyer v.
Kaufmann, 42 U.S.L.W. 2189 (W.D. Mo., Sept. 24, 1973) (three-judge court}, Leutlie•
meyer is described at note 86 supra.
97. 413 U.S. at 462.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
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for parents of children attending private schools that were not
church-related. 98 Then, the appellants argued, if the parents of children who attended nonsectarian private schools received assistance,
the parents of children who attended sectarian schools were entitled
to the same aid as a matter of equal protection, and the aid should
be reinstated.99 The Court properly rejected this argument as "thoroughly spurious."10° First, it found that the aid to nonsectarian
schools could not be severed from the aid to sectarian schools.101
More significantly, it said that, "[e]ven if the Act were clearly severable, valid aid to nonpublic, nonsectarian schools would provide
no lever for aid to their sectarian counterparts."102
Thus, while a state may, on occasion, be required to aid a sectarian institution, cases in which that result is reached are rare indeed. To determine whether a voucher system of the New Hampshire type presents one of the rare cases in which a state will be
required to aid a sectarian institution, it is necessary, once more, to
look to the purposes of the religion clauses of the first amendment.
The New Hampshire system is suspect under the religious freedom aspect of voluntarism. A system that funds private secular
schools but not private sectarian schools places an extra burden on
those who believe that religion must be an integral part of education. But, arguably, the New Hampshire system does nothing less
than the present public school system. Both support only secular
schools. The difference may be only one of appearances. Under the
existing system, everyone seems to be treated equally, possibly because the focus is on the public schools, which are open to all. Under a system like New Hampshire's, the focus may be on the disparate treatment of those desiring to use vouchers at private
sectarian schools. The difference between the two systems is an
emotive one but, nonetheless, may be significant.103
If the free exercise of religion would be burdened by a system
like New Hampshire's, it is still necessary to determine the relative
impact of the burden. In Sherbert v. Verner, 104 the Court found
98. 413 U.S. at 834.
99. See 413 U.S. at 834.
100. 413 U.S. at 834.
101. 413 U.S. at 834.
102. 413 U.S. at 834.
103. This psychological impact problem, which results from lack of uniform treatment of believers and nonbelievers, may help explain some of the attractiveness of Professor Kurland's. strict neutrality theory, which would prohibit the government from
classifying groups on the basis of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a
burden. Such a rule would permit a classification in terms of public or nonpublic
schools but not in terms of sectarian and nonsectarian schools. See text accompanying
note 12 supra.
104. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

914

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 72:895

that the denial of unemployment benefits to Sherbert, a Seventh Day
Adventist, because she refused to work on Saturday and was thus
unable to find a job burdened her free exercise of religion. The
Court resolved the case in favor of Sherbert because the voluntary
practice of religion would have been greatly impaired by the denial
of unemployment benefits, while the granting of benefits would, in
comparison, not further the interest of the religion in question to
any great extent. The pressure on Sherbert to forgo her religious
practice was obviously great, for, unless she acted contrary to the
tenets of her religion, her only source of income would be terminated. In contrast, the burden suffered by the parent who wishes
to send his child to a sectarian school but who is not given any state
financial assistance for that purpose may not be nearly so great. In
most cases, the only burden will be that the parent, rather than the
government, must pay the child's tuition. Less wealthy parents will
have to rely on scholarships. Even if scholarships are not available,
the worst that will befall the parent will be that he will be forced
to send his c_hild to a public school. He would still be able to supplement his child's secular education with less expensive part-time
religious training or training at home.
A voucher system like New Hampshire's would be consistent
with the other aspect of voluntarism, that the tmces of the people
should not be used to support the religious beliefs of others, 10u because it does not fund instruction at religious institutions. The
Sherbert decision may be contrary to this policy, but the kind of
support required by Sherbert is minor compared to the support that
would be provided by including sectarian schools in a voucher system. The Sherbert Court required taxpayers to accommodate religious interests by paying unemployment benefits to a relatively
small number of people who would not othenvise have received
such benefits. A decision requiring that sectarian schools be included
in a voucher system would greatly increase school taxes. 100
The most obvious problem wit!J. the New Hampshire system is
that it will heighten political strife. Because schools will be classified
on the basis of whether they are sectarian or nonsectarian, rather
than on the basis of whether they are public or nonpublic, there
·will be a clear appearance of discrimination, which may lead to increased religious antagonism. The first inklings of such antagonism
can already be seen in the suit by New Hampshire Catholics to
block the forthcoming experiment.107
105. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
106. In the United States, in 1972, there were 4.37 million pupils in some 12,000
Roman Catholic elementary and secondary schools. There were also some 6,000 elementary and secondary schools related to other faiths. The taxpayers do not at present fund
these schools. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 816 (White, J., dissenting).
107. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1973, § 1, at 64, col. 1 (late city ed.).

March 1974]

Notes

915

This political antagonism could be chronic. Every time the state
legislature appropriated funds for the voucher system, the antagonism would rise again. Of course, the antagonism is probably not
much greater than that now existing under a system that gives supporters of sectarian schools no direct benefit from appropriations for
education.
Again, another factor that a court should consider in determining
whether it should require a state to make further accommodations
to religious interests is the amount of discretion that a state should
have in experimenting with methods of educational :financing. Because of the great importance of education, such state experimentation seems desirable and necessary. In addition, where the competing first amendment interests are difficult to reconcile, the states
should have discretion in developing a workable solution to a problem that contains many unknowns.108 A partial voucher system does
have the appearance of discrimination; does burden the free exercise
of religion, albeit in a manner similar to the present financing system; and does heighten the possibility of political strife along religious lines. A system like New Hampshire's, however, does not
differ substantially from the present public school financing system and does not burden the free exercise of religion excessively.
In addition, the first amendment contains a strong policy against
state aid to sectarian institutions, so that, while aid may be -permitted, it is not likely to be required. On balance, the states should
be permitted to experiment with the partial, as well as with the
full, voucher system.
108. See note 19 supra.

